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Abstract 
Do Tax Directors Face Consequences from Tax Avoidance? 
by 
Liora Yehudit Schulman 
Advisor: Professor Joseph Weintrop 
 
I examine the association between tax avoidance and tax director turnover. Specifically, I hand 
collect the names of tax directors and explore whether tax directors face consequences from 
making tax avoidance decisions. This unique dataset allows me to identify the tax director, who 
is directly responsible for taxes, which are one of the most significant accounts, and who prior 
literature has largely ignored due to a lack of availability of data. I find evidence that the tax 
director is more likely to face consequences, as measured by turnover, when their firm’s effective 
tax rate is above their industry median’s effective tax rate and when the effective tax rate is 
volatile. Accordingly, these results provide an understanding of the consequences of tax 
directors’ tax avoidance decisions. In supplemental analysis I find that tax directors face turnover 
when they try to manage earnings utilizing the tax accounts but fail to meet analyst forecasts. In 
addition, I examine samples of firms that engaged in aggressive tax avoidance, had tax-related 
restatements and had tax-related internal control weaknesses. For these three tests, I do not find 
evidence that tax directors face consequences, as measured by turnover, compared to a set of 
matched tax directors. Overall, these supplemental findings suggest that tax directors face 
consequences related to middle range tax avoidance decisions but do not face consequences from 
very aggressive tax avoidance and GAAP-related tax decisions. 
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1. Introduction 
I examine the association between tax avoidance and tax director 1turnover. Tax 
avoidance represents a continuum of tax planning strategies available to managers, ranging from 
clearly legal transactions at one end to more aggressive strategies at the other end (Hanlon and 
Heitzman, 2010). The costs and benefits associated with tax avoidance vary based upon where 
the strategy falls along the continuum. In past papers, Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew (2010) 
document that CEOs and CFOs have manager specific fixed effects on a firms’ overall tax 
avoidance behavior and Gallemore, Maydew and Thornock (2014) document that CEOs and 
CFOs do not bear costs associated with engaging in more aggressive forms of tax avoidance, 
specifically tax shelters. The Dyreng et al. (2010) and Gallemore et al. (2014) studies use SEC 
filings to identify the CEOs and CFOs who set the tone at the top regarding tax strategy, rather 
than the individual that likely has the greatest responsibility for implementation of firms’ tax 
avoidance decisions, the tax director. In this study, I utilize hand collected data from The Tax 
Directory to identify the tax director which allows me to go beyond publicly available data. 
Further, I examine whether tax directors face consequences from their tax avoidance decisions. 
Specifically, I examine turnover as it is the ultimate consequence faced by any employee. 
Accordingly, this research provides a better understanding of the consequences of tax directors’ 
tax avoidance decisions. 
In a recent review paper Hanlon and Heitzman state that “perhaps a more fundamental 
question is who makes the tax decisions for the firm? ...How much control do the top 
                                                            
1 I utilize the term “Tax Director” throughout this paper to refer to the head of tax although firms utilize various 
titles for the head of tax and not exclusively “Tax Director”. Please refer to Section 4.2 for details on the titles of the 
head of tax. 
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executives have over the tax director, and how is their performance monitored? ...These are 
interesting issues we hope to see resolved in the coming years” (2010).  Therefore, I identify the 
person that makes the tax decisions at a firm, the tax director and I examine how tax directors are 
monitored by looking at turnover, which is a consequence of failing to meet performance 
expectations. Understanding how tax avoidance decisions affect turnover is important because 
tax directors’ tax avoidance decisions are likely influenced by whether the outcome of such 
decisions will affect their continued employment with the firm. Further, the outcome of their tax 
avoidance decisions is of concern to stakeholders because taxes are a significant and material 
expense for most firms (Armstrong, Blouin and Larcker 2012). Gallemore et al. (2014) explain 
that managers weigh costs and benefits when deciding whether to engage in tax avoidance 
strategies however the costs are difficult to identify. In this paper I examine whether turnover, 
one potential cost, is a result of certain tax avoidance decisions. I assume that tax directors likely 
weigh the benefits of being overly aggressive (or conservative) against the likelihood of 
termination when making tax avoidance decisions. I believe that examining tax directors is a 
strong setting in which to examine the relation between tax avoidance and turnover because these 
individuals have the most direct influence over implementation of a firms’ tax avoidance 
strategy, and accordingly are likely to be held the most responsible for the outcome of such 
decisions (Armstrong et al., 2012). For example, in a recent paper on consequences of tax 
aggressiveness faced by CEOs/CFO, Gallemore et al. (2014) note that “ideally, we would also 
examine turnover in tax directors, who play a critical role in the tax decisions of the firm” and 
that, unlike the CEO/CFO, “the tax director is most likely to suffer reputational costs from 
aggressive tax avoidance” (pg. 1116). Further, in a recent roundtable discussion hosted by the 
Tax Executives Institute (TEI), CFOs discussed that they spend minimal amount of time on tax 
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planning decisions as they trust the Tax Director with day-to-day tax planning decisions (TEI 
2015).  Therefore exploring whether tax directors in fact face consequences from their tax 
avoidance decisions is worthy of exploration. 
I hand collect the names of tax directors within firms’ tax departments from The Tax 
Directory. The Tax Directory is published by Tax Analysts, and contains the names and titles of 
members of tax departments at Fortune 1000 companies and those listed on the NASDAQ2. One 
volume of The Tax Directory was used by Phillips (2003) to collect contact information to use in 
sending out a survey on tax directors. I use this dataset in a multiyear setting from 1996 to 2013. 
This data allows me to identify those individuals that are in charge of the tax department at a firm 
for the period after FAS109 was enacted3.  
In my main tests I examine three proxies that capture tax director tax avoidance decisions 
in order to determine whether tax directors face consequences from these tax avoidance 
decisions. The first proxy I use for tax directors’ tax avoidance decisions is a firm’s industry-
adjusted effective tax rate (“ETR”). Prior literature has shown that the ETR is used to compare 
one firm to another (Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2008). Further, prior literature provides 
evidence that tax directors are evaluated based on the ETR (Armstrong et al., 2012). 
Additionally, prior literature has found that firms in the same industry have similar opportunities 
when it comes to tax avoidance (Balakrishnan, Blouin and Guay, 2012). Finally, in a recent 
working paper, Chyz and Gaertner (2015) find that forced CEO turnover results from having an 
                                                            
2 The directory is updated annually through research by editors at Tax Analysts and is available to the public for 
purchase via hardcopy book or online.  
3 As I require three years of data prior to the year of tax director turnover for my volatility measure, I begin my tax 
sample in 1996 to allow for data to be collected in 1993, 1994 and 1995 which is after FAS109 was enacted in 1993. 
Similarly for the shelter sample the first shelter was revealed in 1995 and so I require data from 1993 onward in 
order to measure tax director turnover. 
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ETR that is higher than their industry peers ETR. Therefore how a firm’s ETR compares to its 
industry peers’ ETRs is one tax avoidance decision that a tax director is evaluated based on. I 
find a significantly positive association between the industry-adjusted GAAP ETR and tax 
director turnover which means that tax directors are more likely to turnover when their firm’s 
ETR is above their peers and less likely to turnover when their firm’s ETR is below their peer’s 
ETR. This result is economically significant with a one standard deviation increase in industry 
adjusted ETR leading to an increase in the likelihood of tax director turnover by 3.33 percentage 
points.  
The next two proxies I use to capture tax directors’ tax avoidance decisions relate to the 
volatility of the ETR. Firstly, I examine a one year change in the ETR which represents a short-
term measure of volatility of the ETR. Next, I use a long term volatility measure of the ETR 
over a five year horizon. Volatility captures a decision by tax directors to engage in sustainable 
tax avoidance that does not falter over time (McGuire, Neuman and Omer, 2013). McGuire et 
al. (2013) find that sustainability of a firm’s tax avoidance decisions is important because it 
provides information about a firm’s future earnings and that investors use this information to 
infer the persistence of earnings. Further, Schmidt (2006) suggests that CEOs dislike earnings 
surprises that result from tax department activities, suggesting that the more volatile (less stable) 
the ETR, the more likely tax directors face consequences. Using a one year measure of ETR 
stability, I find a statistically significant positive association between a one year increase in the 
GAAP ETR and tax director turnover. I conclude that firms whose GAAP ETR increases from 
one year to the next are more likely to have tax director turnover. Next, using a long term 
measure of ETR volatility based on McGuire et al. (2013), I find a statistically significant 
positive association between ETR volatility and tax director turnover. I conclude that tax 
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director turnover is a consequence of making more volatile (less stable) long term decisions 
when it comes to the ETR.  
Next, I calculate the variables of interest using the Cash ETR instead of the GAAP ETR 
and find insignificant results. This finding suggests that tax directors are evaluated on the book 
ETR and not how much tax the firm actually pays which is consistent with findings in 
Armstrong et al. (2012). Further, the insignificant results found using Cash ETR coupled with 
the significant results using GAAP ETR are consistent with recent media coverage which 
suggest that tax directors care more about GAAP ETR than Cash ETR. 
In supplemental analysis I find that tax directors face turnover when they try to manage 
earnings utilizing the tax accounts but fail to meet analyst forecasts. In addition, I examine 
samples of firms that engaged in aggressive tax avoidance, had tax-related restatements and had 
tax-related internal control weaknesses. For these three tests, I do not find evidence that tax 
directors face consequences, as measured by turnover, compared to a set of matched tax 
directors. 
The results of this study contribute to the tax avoidance literature by showing that a 
consequence of certain tax avoidance decisions is turnover of tax directors. Prior studies 
document some consequences of tax avoidance such as increased likelihood of IRS investigation 
and penalties/ fees, negative stock price reaction and changes to firm value (Hanlon and 
Heitzman, 2010; Desai and Dharmapala, 2009; Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). While these prior 
studies document firm consequences, I document consequences for the key decision maker, the 
tax director as she is directly responsible for tax avoidance decisions. Further, using a hand-
collected dataset, I am able to directly explore this significant role at a firm. This unique dataset 
expands upon previous papers which have either used proprietary data on tax directors or survey 
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data, as The Tax Directory is not subject to the constraints posed by those two forms it is a 
powerful dataset to use. 
Additionally, I contribute to the broader turnover literature by identifying that the ETR 
can be used as a mechanism in disciplining lower level managers. Further, although Dyreng et al. 
(2010) document executive effects on the ETR they do not examine if they face consequences for 
decisions related to the ETR. Finally, I am able to examine consequences of those below the 
CEO which prior literature has shown to be a gap in the literature as most papers focus on CEOs, 
CFOs and board members (Fee and Hadlock, 2004). I examine consequences faced by tax 
directors because they are the individuals directly responsible for tax avoidance decisions and 
they are therefore an important contributor to the firm’s bottom line. Additionally, as noted 
above, Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) note the literature could explore what control executive 
have over tax directors as well as how firms monitor tax directors’ performance. In this paper I 
answer this call by exploring the role of tax director and one monitoring mechanism which is 
turnover.  
The remainder of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss relevant literature. 
In Section 3, I develop my hypotheses. In Section 4, I explain the research design used to test my 
hypotheses. In Section 5, I introduce my empirical mode. In section 6, I provide results from 
testing my hypotheses. In section 7, I perform robustness tests and then perform additional 
analysis. Finally in section 8, I conclude the paper. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Tax Avoidance 
Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) define tax avoidance as a continuum of tax planning 
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strategies ranging from perfectly legal tax planning strategies on one end to very aggressive tax 
strategies on the other end. Firms and managers face potential consequences from engaging or 
not engaging in all forms of tax avoidance depending on what capital markets, shareholders, 
executives and board of directors see as the appropriate level for the firm.  
Prior literature utilizes the ETR as a proxy for tax avoidance and finds that executives are 
evaluated based on the ETR (Phillips, 2003; Dyreng et al., 2008; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; 
Armstrong et al., 2012). Further, prior literature finds that the ETR is used to measure tax 
department performance (Douglas Ellingsworth and McAndrews, 1996). In a study on individual 
fixed effects, Dyreng et al. (2010) find that top executives (CEOs, CFOs, and others listed in the 
SEC proxy statements) have an impact on their firm’s ETR. Finally, Chyz and Gaertner (2015) 
find that forced CEO turnover occurs when a firm’s one year ETR is higher than their industry 
peers ETR. Additionally, they find mixed results regarding whether turnover occurs when a 
firm’s one year ETR is lower than their industry peers ETR.  
While tax avoidance through manipulation of the ETR may be difficult to observe,4 the 
use of tax shelters represent intentional aggressive tax avoidance and whose revelation by the 
IRS/press makes them easy to observe (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). Prior literature has looked 
at consequences of tax shelter use faced by firms and the top five executives. Related to 
consequences faced by firms, Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) document a negative market reaction 
when there is a major news article that a firm engaged in a tax shelter. Related to consequences 
                                                            
4 Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) note some shortcomings of the ETR in that it does not capture conforming tax 
avoidance, tax avoidance through deferral of taxes and other items that do not reflect tax avoidance may impact the 
ETR. Although these shortcomings are important I utilize the ETR in my tests as it is a widely used measure in prior 
literature. 
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faced by executives, in a survey paper, Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin and Shroff (2014) document 
that executives consider potential consequences when making certain tax avoidance decisions. 
However, in a recent empirical paper on tax shelters, Gallemore et al. (2014) document that 
there are no costs from engaging in tax shelters where costs are measured as market reaction, 
CEO/CFO/Auditor turnover, changes in customer behavior as measured by changes in sales, 
sales growth and advertising expenses, and how the media perceives the firm. Although the 
literature has examined whether there are consequences from engaging in tax shelters prior 
papers have only looked at consequences faced by CEOs and CFOs and ignored the tax director, 
the person responsible for implementation of tax avoidance decisions.  
2.2 Turnover 
Classical principal-agent theory (Holmstrom, 1979) dictates that managers are evaluated 
using performance metrics that provide information about an individual’s efforts and abilities and 
which are controlled by the agent. Further it has been shown, empirically, that monitoring and 
review of managers is an important internal managerial control mechanism (Coughlan and 
Schmidt, 1985). Prior literature has extensively explored two areas of managerial control 
exercised by boards: compensation and turnover. There are numerous papers which discuss the 
impact of managers’ decisions and actions on their compensation packages. For example, 
Coughlin and Schmidt (1985) provide evidence indicating that compensation plans approved by 
boards generally link pay to performance measures. Further it has been shown that managers 
who manage expectations are rewarded with larger bonuses (Matsunaga and Park, 2001) and 
higher option compensation (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000), suggesting that decisions made by 
managers are important determinants of a board’s decision during manager reviews. 
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The second area of managerial review explored in prior literature, and which I explore in 
this paper, is turnover. Turnover can be voluntary or forced5 and prior research on CEO turnover 
has found that forced turnover is the dominant type excluding turnover due to retirement. Much 
of the extant turnover literature has focused on the determinants of CEO and CFO turnover. 
Further various papers document that turnover increases following low firm performance 
(Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; Warner, Watts and Wruck., 1988; Weisbach, 1988; Parrino, 
1997). In the tax literature, performance measures relate to tax avoidance decisions, the effective 
tax rate reported on the financial statements, and the amount of cash taxes paid to the IRS. For 
example, Armstrong et al. (2012) find evidence that tax directors’ compensation is positively 
associated with their tax avoidance decisions. Further, they find that unlike tax directors, CEOs 
and CFOs compensation is not associated with tax avoidance decisions.  
Moreover, a growing body of literature has looked at turnover as a proxy for the 
consequences faced by executives who engage in corporate misconduct. The results in prior 
literature are mixed as to whether CEOs/CFOs face consequences as a result of financial 
statement restatements, lawsuits, fraud allegations, regulatory investigations and other actions6. 
For example, Beneish (1999) finds that firms with extremely overstated earnings do not 
experience increased executive turnover relative to a matched control firm. Further, Agrawal, 
Jaffe and Karpoff (1999) find no evidence that CEOs/CFOs and members of the board of 
directors face increased turnover when the firm faces fraud charges. On the other hand, Desai, 
                                                            
5 Farrell and Whidbee (2003) define forced turnover as “changes other than those arising from retirement, normal 
management succession, death, illness, or those involving departure for a prestigious position elsewhere.” 
6 Feroz, Park and Pastena, 1991; Arthaud-Day, Certo, Dalton and Dalton, 2006; Desai, Foley and Hines, 2006; 
Hennes, Leone and Miller, 2008 ; Karpoff , Lee and Martin., 2008 ; Collins, Li and Xie, 2009; McTier and Wald, 
2011. 
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Hogan and Wilkins (2006) find that CEOs at firms that restate earnings are more likely to 
turnover relative to matched control firms. In the tax literature, Gallemore et al. (2014) find that 
turnover of CEOs and CFOs is no more likely for a sample of shelter firms than for a matched 
control and they conclude that top executives do not bare costs from aggressive tax avoidance 
decisions. Although Gallemore look at CEOs and CFOs they concede that “ideally, we would 
also examine turnover in tax directors, who play a critical role in the tax decisions of the firm” 
and that unlike the CEO/CFO, “the tax director is most likely to suffer reputational costs from 
aggressive tax avoidance” (Gallemore et al., 2014, pg. 1116). In a recent tax paper, Armstrong, 
Blouin, Jagolinzer and Larcker (2015), note that unresolved agency problems may influence a 
manager to choose a level of tax avoidance that varies from a level desired by shareholders. 
2.3 Tax Directors 
I focus on identifying tax directors because they are directly responsible for 
implementation of tax decisions at their firms. I choose to focus on the tax director within the 
tax department because the decisions he or she makes affect the income tax expense, a 
significant and material expense for the firm. Moreover, the decisions made within the tax 
department can have implications for other departments and individuals within the firm. For 
example, anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that the corporate tax department can serve 
as a contributor to the bottom line (Crocker and Slemrod, 2005; Robinson, Sikes and Weaver, 
2010). Also, prior literature has shown that CEOs’ and business unit managers’ compensation 
can be tied to taxes (Phillips, 2003; Guenther, Matsunaga and Williams, 2013). Armstrong et al. 
(2012) find that GAAP effective tax rates are associated with tax director compensation, thus 
suggesting that compensation committee’s care about ETRs; however there is no empirical 
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evidence as to whether tax directors face consequences as a result of decisions made related to 
the ETR. 
Prior and concurrent papers have examined executives’ impact on the ETR or whether 
executives face turnover from tax avoidance decisions. Firstly, Dyreng et al. (2010) find that top 
executives (CEO, CFO and other) have an effect on tax avoidance by setting the “tone at the top” 
with regard to the firm’s tax strategy. However, Dyreng et al. (2010) are only able to look at the 
top five executives listed in Execucomp (mainly CEO/CFO) and, thus fail to test the person that 
is directly responsible for day-to-day tax avoidance decisions. Further, a recent roundtable of 
CFOs hosted by the TEI noted that CFOs spend minimal time on tax planning decisions as they 
trust the Tax Director with day-to-day tax planning implementation (TEI 2015).  
3. Hypothesis Development 
Tax Avoidance and Tax Director Turnover 
In this paper I look at two tax avoidance decisions related to the ETR, the industry- 
adjusted ETR and the volatility of the ETR, and examine whether the person I identified as the 
tax director faces consequences as a result of these two decisions. 
3.1 Industry Measure 
Firstly, I examine whether there are consequences to tax directors related to the decision 
to vary from the industry median ETR. Both anecdotal and empirical evidence suggest CEOs and 
boards are concerned with how their firms’ performance compares to their industry peers. 
Specifically, Ferrell and Whidbee (2003) document that CEOs/CFOs are evaluated based on 
many variables one such being how they compare to their industry. Although the literature seems 
to agree that how one measures up to their industry peer matters, what is not clear is whether tax 
12 
 
directors turnover for having an ETR that is higher or lower than their peers ETR. 
On the one hand, turnover may be more likely when a firm’s ETR is higher than the 
industry median ETR because the board/CEO believes that the tax director is not engaging in 
efficient tax planning by not taking advantage of tax planning opportunities. In a Fortune article, 
a KPMG partner relays a story of a client who said that they were only interested in hiring an 
accounting firm to perform advisory services if they could “get their tax rate down, because it 
was higher than their competitors’ and they were embarrassed” (Novack, 1998). Further, through 
discussion with a former tax director, I noted that tax directors are required to present the ETR of 
their peer firms and need to discuss why they could not keep their ETR inline or lower than their 
peer firms’ ETR. In a recent empirical analysis of forced CEO turnover, Chyz and Gaertner 
(2015) note that taxes account for a wealth transfer from a firm to the taxing authorities and note 
that CEOs are held responsible for such a decrease in wealth. As with CEOs, tax directors would 
be held responsible for having a higher ETR (reporting a higher tax expense) relative to their 
industry peers when shareholders prefer tax-reducing decisions.  
Alternatively, when a firm’s ETR is lower than the industry median ETR, the 
board/CEO could interpret this as the tax director being too aggressive which could impact the 
firm’s reputation.7 Further, Desai and Dharmapala (2006) note that there could be reputational 
penalties from engaging in too much tax avoidance and therefore CEOs/boards concerned with 
this would fire a tax director for having a ETR that is lower than their industry peers ETR.  
Chyz and Gaertner (2015) use a sample of forced CEO turnovers and find mixed results as to 
whether turnover is associated with having an ETR lower than their industry peers’ ETR.  
                                                            
 
7 Bankman (2004) shows that firms that engage in aggressive tax planning would be labeled “poor corporate 
citizens” which has adverse effects. Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) find small negative market reaction to firms that 
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As prior literature is mixed as to whether having an ETR that is higher or lower than 
industry peers is associates with tax director turnover, I therefore state my first set of 
hypotheses in the null form as follows: 
H1: Turnover is not associated with a firm’s industry-adjusted ETR.  
3.2 Tax Rate Stability 
Another decision made by a tax director is the stability of the firm’s ETR. Empirical tax 
research has explored the volatility of the ETR. Guenther et al. (2013) find that firms with more 
volatile cash ETRs exhibit greater stock return volatility while McGuire et al. (2013) find that 
the stability of a firm’s tax strategy provides unique information about earnings persistence. 
Finally, it has been shown that that some firms have the ability to maintain a consistently low 
effective tax rate over long periods of time (Dyreng et al., 2008) and Schmidt (2006) suggests 
that executives dislike earnings surprises that result from tax department activities. Assuming 
that stock returns and earnings are of major concern to boards/CEOs it would follow that they 
would monitor ETR volatility and that, in turn, tax directors would be evaluated based on the 
decisions they made related to this measure. Consistent with this idea, the Tax Executive 
Institute (TEI) found that the ability to avoid tax-related earnings surprises was one of the 
evaluation criteria for 70 percent of tax executives responding to a survey (TEI 2005). Taken 
together, one would expect that if the ETR is very volatile the board/CEO would interpret this 
as the tax director not having sufficient control over tax avoidance and thus I would expect to 
see volatility associated with turnover. 
On the other hand, according to Guenther et al. (2013), a firm’s tax payments change over 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
engage in tax avoidance. 
.  
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time for a variety of reasons, including changes in local or international tax law and the 
settlement of aggressive tax positions whether for or against the firm. Given this finding, it could 
be that ETRs appear to be volatile but they are just due to changes in operations and therefore an 
association between ETR volatility and tax director turnover would not exist empirically. 
As prior literature has shown mixed results for finding an association between volatility 
and turnover I state my second hypothesis in the null form as follows: 
 
H2: Turnover is not associated with the volatility of a firm’s ETR. 
4. Research Design 
4.1 Sample Selection 
In order to identify the tax director I hand collect annual information on tax departments 
from Tax Analysts’ The Tax Directory8. The Tax Directory was started in 1992 and is available 
for purchase annually via a hardcopy book or electronically to subscribers. Tax Analysts gathers 
data for Fortune 1000 firms and those listed on the NASDAQ. On an annual basis the Tax 
Analysts editors search a public database as well as company websites for information on the 
members of a firm’s tax department. The quantity of tax department members listed varies per 
firm and depends on what data Tax Analysts can find. For each firm Tax Analysts lists the type 
of firm (public or private), a measure of firm size (total assets, sales), executive names and 
executive titles. Although titles vary per firm the usual titles include: Tax director, Tax manager, 
Legal Counsel, Tax Accountant, Controller, CFO and others. 
                                                            
8 Information about The Tax Directory was gathered through a visit to the Tax Analysts headquarters and through 
conversations with The Tax Directory’s editor and staff. I would like to thank Tax Analysts for access to the data 
and for taking the time to meet with me. 
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This data set has been used before for data for surveys but it has not been used for a long 
time series in an empirical accounting research paper and therefore I am the first to use it in this 
setting. The use of this data is my primary contribution as it allows access to a very important set 
of managers at a firm. All other data used thus far has come from Execucomp which lists the top 
five compensated executive (CEO, CFO, COO and others). Using The Tax Directory dataset 
allows me go beyond prior literature and to focus my tests on the person directly responsible for 
tax decisions. 
As The Tax Directory is not linked to Compustat I first matched all company names 
listed in The Tax Directory from 1996-2013 to all company names listed in the Compustat 
Annual File for the same period. To match the two sets of company names I utilize a textual 
matching code which returns a proportion of common letters (“pcl”) between the company name 
listed in Compustat and the company name listed in The Tax Directory and identifies the gvkey 
in Compustat to be used for each company in The Tax Directory (Rai 2012). Following Rai 
(2012) I set a pcl threshold of 0.80 and by hand checked all the matches with pcl between 0.80 
and 1 to make sure the code worked properly and the company names are the same. To create an 
initial sample I included 3,379 unique matches, that had a perfect match (a pcl of 1) between the 
company name listed in The Tax Directory and that listed in Compustat.  I then assign matches 
with pcl less than 1 and greater than 0.80 that had the following as the only differences between 
the company name listed in The Tax Directory and Compustat company name: corp/ corporation, 
inc/incorporated, or co/ company. Additionally I included matches with pcl between 1 and 0.80 
where the only difference in the company names was the use of the word ‘The’. The remaining 
matches with pcl between 1 and 0.80 that didn’t meet any of the above criteria were not added to 
the initial sample. The match results return the gvkey of the matched firm next to the pcl and so 
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next I assigned the corresponding Compustat gvkey to each firm in the tax directory turnover 
file. I then merge the tax director turnover file to a file with all relevant variables from 
Compustat needed perform tests of H1 and H2 and the initial merge resulted in 8,211 firm-years. 
I exclude 1,237 firm- years missing a tax director in the previous year as I require two years of 
tax director data to calculate the TURNOVER variable. Additionally, I exclude 438 foreign 
incorporated firm-years by removing firms with fic !="USA”. Next, I exclude subsidiaries by 
dropping 300 firm-years with Stko = 1 and 2, which are subsidiaries of public and private firms, 
respectively. Finally, I exclude 182 firm-years with missing pre-tax income and tax expense as 
pre-tax income and tax expense are the main components used in calculating the GAAP ETR 
which I need for my main tests. The total firm-year observations are 6,054 firm-years from 1,118 
unique firms. 
I collect financial data from Compustat for each observation firm-year from 1992-2013. 
Although my sample is from 1996-2013, as I test whether decisions made by tax directors are 
associated with TURNOVER in year t I require data from t-1 to code the independent and control 
variables and therefore pull data from 1993 onwards. Specifically for H2, I require that firms 
have data for five years before my sample in order to calculate the volatility measure which is 
based on a five year window. I use the ExecuComp database to collect CEO and CFO names to 
create the CEOTURNOVER and CFOTURNOVER control variables. I am only able to gather 
CEO (CFO) data for 2/3 (1/3) of the firm-years and therefore present results for all tests by not 
including CEOTURNOVER/CFOTURNOVER as controls and then including 
CEOTURNOVER/CFOTURNOVER as controls. 
Table 2, Panel A provides details about turnover within my sample. In the sample, tax 
director TURNOVER is roughly 4.4% with 265 firm-years with tax director TURNOVER and 
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5789 firm-years with no tax director TURNOVER. The 4.4% rate of TURNOVER although lower 
than the turnover rate for CEOs and CFOs9, is consistent with the notion that turnover is rare and 
that tax directors will keep their jobs. Panel B of Table 2 presents a breakdown of the sample and 
the Compustat universe for the same sample period by industry, based on the Fama and French 
17 industry classification. Roughly 60% of the sample is from the following industries: Retail 
Stores (8%), Machinery and Business Equipment (13%), Financial Institutions (15%) and Other 
(24%). Additionally, the sample is similar in industry makeup to that in Compustat with the 
exception of 15% of the sample coming from the Financial Institutions industry whereas it 
comprises 35% of the Compustat universe. From reviewing my sample makeup I noted that 
about two thirds of the Financial Institutions dropped out of the sample due to The Tax Directory 
not listing a Tax Director and listing only the CFO. Panel C of Table 2 shows TURNOVER by 
year. The number of firm-years per year is evenly distributed over the sample period of 1996-
2013. Finally, Panel D of Table 3 shows the median Total Assets, GAAP ETR and CASH ETR 
for my sample compared to the universe of firms on Compustat for the same period as my 
sample (1996-2013). The GAAP and CASH ETRs are comparable between my sample and the 
Compustat universe but the total assets for my sample are much larger due to The Tax Directory 
containing only Fortune 1000 firms.  
4.2 Measuring Tax Director Turnover 
In my sample, tax director turnover is defined as a change in the individual occupying a 
specific position from year t to year t+1. For the tax avoidance sample I code the dependent 
variable, TURNOVER as follows: For each firm-year I determine the tax director following Chen 
                                                            
9 In a prior paper by Farrell and Whidbee paper find CEO turnover for 363/4015 firm-years for period 1986-1997 
which is roughly 9%. 
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et al. (2015) as the person with a  title such as “Tax Director,” “Vice President-Tax,” “Chief Tax 
Counsel,” and “International Tax Counsel”10. I then compare the name listed in The Tax 
Directory in year t to the name listed in the year t+1 Tax Directory, if there is no change I set 
TURNOVER equal to zero, if there is a change I set TURNOVER equal to one. I further require a 
firm have only one entry per year to make sure I am only testing one head of the tax department. 
For those firms with multiple entries per firm-year11, I keep the person listed first in The Tax 
Directory as the tax director and drop the other person listed.   
4.3 Measuring Tax Avoidance 
I use three measures to capture tax avoidance decisions which capture actions taken 
that fall along the spectrum of tax avoidance. 
Firstly, to test the association between tax avoidance and turnover (H1), I follow 
Balakrishnan et al. (2012) to calculate my first measure of tax avoidance, INDDEV. INDDEV is 
a dummy variable which is set equal to one when firm’s ETR is above the industry median ETR 
and set equal to zero when firm’s ETR is below the industry median ETR. I calculate INDDEV 
using the GAAP and the Cash ETR and estimate equation (1) separately for each. I utilize the 
Fama and French 17 industry classification to group by industry12. Following Dyreng et al. 
(2010) I calculate the GAAPETR as total tax expense divided by pretax book income (adjusted 
                                                            
10 The Tax Directory lists CFOs for some firms as the first person in directory I exclude CFOs as I rather control for 
them in the main regressions so as to not confuse turnover of the CFO with turnover of a member of the tax 
department. 
11 I identified 1,064 firm-years with multiple entries and by hand inspected the listing order of the names.  
12 I utilize all firms listed on Compustat to generate the industry median ETR and not just those firms in my sample. 
The mean/median industry GAAP ETR is 0.325/0.310 which is in line with prior literature and which confirms that 
the firm-years utilized are appropriate.  
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for special items). Prior literature has found that GAAP and CASH ETR capture different 
objectives executives may have when it comes to tax (Dyreng, et al., 2010). Therefore, I then 
estimate equation (1) using CASHETR instead of GAAPETR to determine whether tax 
avoidance through the CASHETR is also associated with turnover. To do this, I calculate 
CASHETR as defined by Dyreng et al. (2008, 2010) as cash taxes paid divided by pretax book 
income (adjusted for special items). The industry median ETR (GAAP and CASH separately) is 
found by calculating the ETR for each firm-year listed on Compustat excluding foreign 
incorporated firms and subsidiaries. Further, following Gupta and Newberry (1997) I bound the 
GAAP and CASH ETRs to be between 0 and 1 to mitigate the impact of outliers. I then assign 
each firm-year to an industry based on a firm’s two digit sic code. I remove firms with missing 
ETR values and then calculate the industry median ETR grouping by the two digit sic code and 
by year. INDDEV is a lagged variable as turnover in year t+1 is based on whether the ETR 
deviated from its industry in year t. 
Next, to test the association between ETR stability and turnover (H2), I use a one year 
benchmark measure of ETR as well as a long-term five year measure of ETR volatility. Firstly, I 
compute a short-term one year measure of ETR stability, ETRCHANGE, as a change in the ETR 
from the previous year (t-1) to current year (t). A positive (negative) value for ETRCHANGE 
means this year’s ETR is higher (lower) than last year’s indicating an increase (decrease) in the 
ETR. Second, I follow McGuire et al. (2013) and compute a long-term measure of ETR 
volatility, ETRVOL, which is a measures of the coefficient of variation calculated as the standard 
deviation of annual ETRs scaled by the absolute value of the annual mean ETRs over the same 
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five year period (from t-4 to t)13. A low coefficient of variation for ETRVOL means that the tax 
strategy is stable. On the other hand, a high coefficient of variation means that the tax strategy is 
very volatile. In order to be able to calculate the ETRVOL variable I require that observations 
have non-missing data for tax expense for the period t to t-4. ETRVOL is calculated separately 
using GAAPETR and CASHETR. 
5. Empirical Model: Tax Avoidance and Turnover 
To test the association between tax avoidance and turnover I estimate the following logistic 
model: 
TURNOVERi,t+1 = β0 + β1TAXAVOIDi,t  + β2CEOTURNOVERi,t +β3CFOTURNOVERi,t 
 + β4SIZEi,t + β5PROFITABILITYi,t  + β6PERFORMANCEi,t    
 + βjYEAR + βkINDUSTRY + εi,t (1)
where:   
TURNOVER = measure of tax director turnover as defined above;  
TAXAVOID = measures of tax avoidance using INDDEV,  ETRCHANGE 
 and ETRVOL as defined above;  
CEOTURONOVER =  one if the CEO listed in year t is different than the CEO listed in year 
 t-1 and zero otherwise;  
CFOTURNOVER = one if the CFO listed in year t is different than the CFO listed in year 
 t-1 and zero otherwise;  
                                                            
13 I calculate it as follows: ETRVOL=
where n=5
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SIZE = natural log of total assets for year t;  
PROFITABILTY = the ratio of pre-tax income at year t to total assets at the beginning 
 of the year (also known as ROA) at year t;  
PERFORMANCE = earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) in year t divided by sales 
    in year t.  
 
I estimate equation (1) using INDDEV, ETRCHANGE and ETRVOL as the independent 
measures of tax avoidance decisions. I winsorized all continuous variables at the 1% and 99% 
level to correct for extreme outliers in the sample. I also include several control variables utilized 
in the turnover literature that have been shown to impact turnover such as size, performance and 
profitability14. Next I control for CEO and CFO turnover as it has been shown that a new 
CEO/CFO could bring a new team of directors and therefore TURNOVER could be driven by the 
new CEO/CFO and not by the measures of tax avoidance decisions (Dyreng et al., 2010). 
Finally, I include year and industry fixed effects to control for macroeconomic or industry 
specific events, respectively, which could impact TURNOVER. Refer to Appendix A for a full 
description of the variables.  
A significant positive coefficient on INDDEV implies that tax director TURNOVER is 
more (less) likely to occur when the firm’s ETR is above (below) its industry’s median ETR. 
A significant positive (negative) coefficient on ETRCHANGE implies that tax director 
TURNOVER is more likely to occur when the firm’s ETR is higher (lower) than it was the 
previous year, meaning there was an increase in the ETR from the previous year. 
                                                            
14 Ideally I would like to control for Tax Director Tenure but I am unable to collect data related to length of tenure at 
the firm from The Tax directory. 
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A significant positive (negative) coefficient on ETRVOL implies that tax director 
TURNOVER is more (less) likely to occur when the firm’s ETR is volatile. 
6. Results 
6.1 Univariate Results 
Table 3, Panel A contains descriptive statistics for variables used in testing H1 and H2. I 
list details for the full sample, firm-years with turnover=1 and the firm-years with turnover=0. 
The variable of interest for H1 is INDDEV. The full sample mean and median INDDEV are 
positive which would suggest that turnover is more likely when a firm’s ETR is above the 
industry median ETR. Also the variables of interest for H2, ETRCHANGE and ETRVOL, full 
sample mean and median values are all positive indicating the ETR is volatile on average. The 
short-term volatility measure ETRCHANGE is more pronounced for the turnover sample (mean 
0.22) compared to the no-turnover sample (mean 0.00). Interestingly the univariate results show 
the long term positive volatility as seen in the ETRVOL variable is more pronounced for the no- 
turnover sample (mean 1.61) compared to the turnover sample (mean .85). This result leads me 
to apply further restrictions on the sample used in the multivariate analysis. Further I find 
significant differences between the means and medians of INDDEV and ETRVOL of firms with 
no-turnover (turnover=0) and firms with turnover (turnover=1). These univariate results suggest 
a negative (positive) association between INDDEV (ETRCHANGE/ETRVOL) and tax director 
TURNOVER. 
Regarding the control variables, CEOTURNOVER and CFOTURNOVER, both the 
turnover and the no-turnover groups have median turnover of 0 suggesting that CEOs and CFOs 
do not face turnover, on average. Also the means of the SIZE and PERFORMANCE control 
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variables are significantly different between the two groups while the means of the 
PROFITABILITY control variable are not different. These univariate results suggest that firm-
years with tax director are larger in size to those without tax director turnover. Also the 
performance of the turnover=1 firm-years is higher than that of the turnover=0 firm-years which 
suggests that performance is not driving the difference between the firms.  
Panel B contains Spearman and Pearson (above and below respectively) correlation coefficients 
for all variables in equation (1) as well as the GAAP and CASH ETRs. An asterisk next to the 
coefficients indicated a p-value of .05 or less. GAAP and CASH ETRs are very highlight 
correlated as would be expected. As in Panel A, INDEV is positively and significantly correlated 
with TUROVER (Spearman: 0.0383 and Pearson: 0.0346). As in Panel A, ETRCHANGE is 
positively although not significantly correlated with TURNOVER. As this is the case I further 
restricted my model to non-loss firms as loss- firms can make the coefficients difficult to 
interpret. Finally, ETRVOL is negatively although not significantly correlated with 
TURNOVER. As with ETRCHANGE this could be due to having loss firms in the sample and so 
in my multivariate analysis I further limit the sample to include only non-loss firms for the entire 
5 year period utilized in calculating the ETR variable.  
6.2 Multivariate Results for H1 
Table 4 presents results of estimating equation (1) where the dependent variable is tax 
director TURNOVER and the variable of interest is INDDEV. In columns 1 and 4, I estimate 
equation (1) while controlling for SIZE, PROFITABILITY and PERFORMANCE while in 
columns 2, 3, 5 and 6, I also control for CEOTURNOVER and CFOTURNOVER; I do this 
because CFO data is not listed on Execucomp for 2/3 of the sample and so the sample size is 
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greatly reduced. Further, in columns 3 and 6 I limit the sample to firms with no losses as 
prior papers cite that interpreting coefficients from firm-years with losses is difficult. I 
estimate equation (1) utilizing GAAPETR in columns 1, 2 and 3 and using CASHETR in 
columns 4, 5 and 6. 
In column 1 the coefficient of interest, INDDEV, is significantly positive at the 5% 
level (coef: 0.38 and p-value: 0.026). Even after adding CEOTURNOVER and 
CFOTURNOVER, in column 2 and limiting the sample to non-loss firms in column 3, the 
results show a positive and significant coefficient. Overall, the results from columns 1, 2 and 3 
show that there is a positive association between the industry median ETR and tax director 
turnover. This result is economically significant with a one standard deviation increase in 
INDDEV leading to an increase in the likelihood of tax director turnover by 3.33 percentage 
points. This finding suggests that the tax director is more likely to turnover when her firm’s 
ETR is above its industry’s median ETR and less likely to turnover when her firm’s ETR is 
below its industry’s median ETR. 
Results of estimating logistic model (1) using CASHETR can be found in columns 4, 5 
and 6. The coefficients on the variable of interest, INDDEV have insignificant positive 
coefficients in columns 4, 5 and 6 suggesting that deviating from the industry median 
CASHETR is not associated with tax director turnover. This finding is consistent with findings 
in Armstrong et al. (2012) that compensation of tax directors has little relationship with 
CASHETR, which they interpret as meaning that tax directors are compensated based on how 
they can reduce the tax expense through the GAAPETR and not through the CASHETR. 
Further, CASHETR may have components of taxes paid related to prior year activities and as 
such may not be a good measure to use to test for an association between tax director turnover 
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and tax avoidance decisions. 
6.3 Multivariate Results for H2 
Table 5 presents results of estimating equation (1) where the dependent variable is tax 
director TURNOVER and the variable of interest is ETRCHANGE. In columns 1 and 4, I 
estimate equation (1) while controlling for SIZE, PROFITABILITY and PERFORMANCE 
while in columns 2 and 5 I also control for CEOTURNOVER and CFOTURNOVER. Further, 
in columns 3 and 6 I limit the sample to firms with no losses for the two years used to 
calculate ETRCHANGE as prior papers cite that interpreting coefficients from firm-years with 
losses is difficult. I estimate equation (1) utilizing GAAPETR to calculate ETRCHANGE in 
columns 1, 2 and 3 and using CASHETR to calculate ETRCHANGE in columns 4, 5 and 6. 
In column 1 the coefficient of interest, ETRCHANGE, is significantly positive at the 5% 
level (coef: 0.04 and p-value: 0.019) indicating that the more volatile the GAAPETR the more 
likely tax director TURNOVER will occur. Even after adding CEOTURNOVER and 
CFOTURNOVER, in column 2 and limiting the sample to non-loss firm-years, in column 3, 
ETRCHANGE has statistically significant positive coefficients. Overall, the results in Table 5 
suggest that when the GAAP ETR is higher than it was the year before the more likely the tax 
director will face a consequence in the form of turnover. 
Results of estimating logistic models (1) using CASHETR to generate ETRCHANGE 
can be found in columns 4, 5 and 6. The coefficients on the variable of interest, 
ETRCHANGE, have insignificant negative coefficients suggesting that CASHETR is not 
associated with tax director turnover which is in line with prior literature as mentioned in 
Section 6.2. 
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Table 6 presents results of estimating equation (1) where the dependent variable is tax 
director TURNOVER and the variable of interest is ETRVOL. Due to the long term nature of 
the ETRVOL variable I limit the sample used to firm-years where there were no losses for the 
whole five year period used to calculate ETRVOL. I remove firm-years with losses in any of 
the previous five years as prior papers cite that interpreting coefficients from firm-years with 
losses is difficult. In columns 1 and 4, I estimate equation (1) while controlling for, SIZE, 
PROFITABILITY and PERFORMANCE, while in columns 2 and 5 I also control for 
CEOTURNOVER and CFOTURNOVER. Additionally, in columns 3 and 6, I limit the sample 
to firm-years with no tax director turnover during the 5 year period to remove confounding 
effects of prior tax director not being able to keep the ETR stable. I estimate equation (1) 
utilizing GAAPETR to calculate ETRVOL in columns 1, 2 and 3 and using CASHETR to 
calculate ETRVOL in columns 4, 5 and 6. 
In column 1 the coefficient of interest, ETRVOL, is positive although insignificant. In 
column 2 when CEOTURNOVER and CFOTURNOVER are added as controls the ETRVOL 
coefficient becomes significantly positive at the 10% level indicating that the more volatile the 
GAAPETR the more likely tax director TURNOVER will occur. After removing firm-years in 
which there was tax director turnover in the previous five years, the coefficient of interest, 
ETRVOL is significantly positive at the 5% level (coef: 0.08 and p-value: 0.043). Overall, the 
results in Table 6 suggest that that the more volatile the GAAPETR the more likely the tax 
director will face a consequence in the form of turnover. 
Results of estimating logistic models (1) using CASHETR to generate ETRVOL can be 
found in columns 4, 5 and 6. The coefficients on the variable of interest, ETRVOL, have negative 
although insignificant coefficients suggesting that CASHETR is not associated with tax director 
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turnover which is in line with prior literature as mentioned in Section 6.1. 
Overall the results in Tables 4, 5 and 6 taken together, suggest that tax directors will face 
turnover as a result of making tax avoidance decisions which result in higher GAAP ETRs than 
the GAAP ETRs of peer firms. Further, tax directors will face turnover as a result of making tax 
avoidance decisions which are less certain and thus lead to a more volatile GAAP ETR. These 
results suggest that, on average, firms prefer sustainable tax avoidance decisions that keeping the 
GAAP ETR comparable to peers in their industry. 
7. Supplemental Analysis 
I perform additional analysis in this section. In section 7.1, I perform various robustness 
tests on my main regressions. While tax directors may or may not be fired as a consequence of 
their overall tax avoidance decisions there are certain decisions that result in egregious outcomes 
for which one would expect to see the tax director turnover. Therefore, in sections 7.2 – 7.4, I 
examine three decisions that may impact tax director turnover: engaging in aggressive tax 
shelters, having a tax-related financial statement restatement and having tax-related internal 
control weakness. Finally, in section 7.5, I examine whether tax director turnover is associated 
with the inability to manage earnings through the tax accounts.   
7.1 Robustness Tests 
I perform robustness tests on my main tests in the following section. First, as domestic 
and multinational firms have different tax avoidance opportunities I estimate equation 1 for all 
three variables of interest separately for multinational and domestic firms. I identify firms as 
being domestic if they have 0 foreign income (pifo is 0 or missing) and multinational if they have 
foreign income (pifo has a value). I find (Table 8, Panel A) that the INDDEV variable is only 
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significantly positive for domestic firms and not for multinational firms. For the ETRCHANGE 
and ETRVOL variables I find no difference between domestic and multinational firms. I interpret 
this as meaning that for domestic firms varying from their industry peers is a mechanism used in 
making turnover decision for the Tax Director. Next, as the financial crisis led to increased levels 
of turnover in general, in order to rule this out I estimation equation (1) excluding those firm-
years from 2008. I find (Table 8, Panel B) that there is no change in significance for the 
INDDEV or ETRCHANGE variables but for some models significance declines for ETRVOL. 
The drop in significance for the ETRVOL may be due to the measure requiring five years of 
ETR information so it is more difficult to remove the impact of the 2008 financial crisis. Third, 
as Armstrong et al. (2012) find that only the compensation contract of the Tax Director is tied to 
the GAPP ETR and not the CEO or CFO, I examine whether this holds for my sample. In order 
to do this, I estimated equation (1) with CEO turnover and CFO turnover separately as the 
dependent variables instead of Tax director turnover and utilize the same right hand side 
variables. I find (Table 8, Panel C) that none of the variables of interest, INDDEV, 
ETRCHANGE or ETRVOL are significantly associated with CEO or CFO turnover. Therefore I 
conclude that the decision to fire a CEO or CFO is not based on the tax avoidance decisions I 
identify. This finding is in line with the Armstrong et al. (2012) paper as they find no association 
between compensation of the CEO and CFO and tax avoidance. Finally, I estimate equation (1) 
utilizing various timeframes for CEO and CFO turnover to rule out timing concerns that I am not 
capturing the correct time period for CEO or CFO turnover. When I control for CEO and CFO 
Turnover at t-2 I find no change in my main results (Table 8, Panel D).   
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7.2 Tax Aggressiveness and Tax Director Turnover 
While my main tests examine tax avoidance which falls in the middle to right part of 
the tax avoidance continuum, in this section I examine tax aggressiveness, which falls in the 
far right part of the tax avoidance continuum. In a recent paper, Gallemore et al. (2014) find 
that CEOs and CFOs of shelter firms do not face higher rates of turnover compared to those 
of control firms and they conclude that top executives do not bare consequences from 
aggressive tax avoidance. However, they point out that the results found for CEO/CFO may 
not apply to the tax director and they conclude the paper by stating that it would be interesting 
to examine whether “lower-level executives, such as those in the tax department, do suffer 
turnover” (Gallemore et al, 2014, pg. 1129). Therefore, I examine whether tax directors face 
turnover after engaging in a tax shelter which is an aggressive tax avoidance decision. 
In order to compare my results to prior literature I utilize the same sample of shelter firms 
as used by Gallemore et al (2014). Their sample consists of shelters as revealed between 1995 
and 2004 and is made up of firm-year shelters from prior literature as well as newly identified 
shelters. The sample consists of 44 firm-year shelter observations as documented in Graham and 
Tucker (2006), 107 firm-year shelter observations as documented in Hanlon and Slemrod (2009), 
33 firm-year shelter observations as documented in Wilson (2009), and an additional 61 shelter 
firm-years as identified by Gallemore et al. (2014) for a total of 245 firm-year shelter 
observations. After removing duplicates, foreign firms, firms with ambiguous or missing 
revelation date, revelations before 1993, and firm-years with insufficient data for matching 
Gallemore et al. (2014) have 118 firms with 128 tax shelter firm-year observations. Out of the 
sample of 118 shelter firms, Gallemore et al. (2014) are able to gather CEO Turnover data for 
107 firms. I use the 128 total revelations as the basis for my test. As with my main tests, I utilize 
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The Tax Directory to identify members of the tax department for both treatment (shelter firm-
years) and control firm-years for a period of five years surrounding the revelation of a shelter in 
order to code the TURNOVER variable. I exclude CFOs15, even if they are listed first, and chose 
the next person listed as the first person listed. Further, I require that the treatment sample and 
the control sample be listed in The Tax Directory16 which reduces the shelter observations to 87 
firm-years which I match to 87 control firm-years. Finally, in order to utilize the difference-in-
differences technique I require that there is sufficient data for all variables used in estimating 
equation (2) for a five year period around the revelation year. I collect financial data from 
Compustat for each firm-year for both control and treatment firms. I use the ExecuComp 
database to collect CEO and CFO names to create the CEOTURNOVER and CFOTURNOVER 
control variables. 
To test whether tax directors that engage in tax shelters are more likely to turnover 
compared to a matched firm, I utilize a difference-in-differences design following 
Gallemore et al. (2014) and estimate the following logistic model17: 
TURNOVERi,t+1 = β0 + β1SHELTERFIRMi + β2REVEALYEARi,t  
 + β3SHELTERFIRMi*REVEALYEARi,t + β4CEOTURNOVERi,t  
                                                            
15 I exclude CFOs as I rather control for them in the main regressions so as to not confuse turnover of the CFO with 
turnover of a member of the tax department. 
16 As the name listed on Compustat is the current company name I search the EDGAR online filings on sec.gov for 
prior company names to make sure that I search The Tax Directory for all possible names used by the firm. 
17 TURNOVER= measure of tax director turnover as defined in equation (1), refer to Appendix A; SHELTERFIRM= 
1 for firms that engaged in a tax shelter, control firm is coded zero; REVEALYEAR = one for both the shelter and 
control firm in the year during and after the shelter was revealed, zero otherwise; SHELTERFIRM *REVEALYEAR = 
interaction term that represents the likelihood of turnover for the shelterfirm after the shelter was revealed. 
CEOTURNOVER, CFOTURNOVER, SIZE, PROFITABILITY and PERFORMANCE are coded as in equation (1), 
refer to Appendix A.  
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 + β5CFOTURNOVERi,t  + β6SIZEi,t  + β7PROFITABILITYi,t    
 + β8PERFORMANCEi,t  + εi,t (2) 
Following Gallemore et al. (2014) I utilize the difference-in-differences methodology in 
order to isolate the effect of revelation of a shelter on tax director turnover separate from other 
confounding factors that could create differences between the control and treatment group. To 
do this, I match each shelter firm-year (treatment) to a control firm-year in the same industry 
that is closest in size (total assets) in the year before the shelter is revealed. Specifically, I utilize 
the Fama-French 17 industry classifications to assign possible control firms to an industry 
(Fame and French, 1997). If the matched firm is not listed in The Tax Directory I choose the 
firm that is the next closest in total assets to the treatment firm as a control firm. I cluster the 
standard errors at the control-treatment match level by creating a match id that assigns each 
control/treatment match a number from 1 to 87. 
I also control for CEOTURNOVER, CFOTURNOVER, SIZE, PROFITABILITY and 
PERFORMANC18. 
A significant positive coefficient on the variable of interest, 
 SHELTERFIRM*REVEALYEAR, implies a greater likelihood of tax director turnover 
after revelation of tax shelter relative to a matched control firm. 
7.2.1 Multivariate results 
Table 7 presents results of estimating equation (2) where the dependent variable is 
                                                            
18 Gallemore et al. (2014) also control for CEO RETIRE which is an indicator variable set equal to one when the 
CEO is 64 years or over. As my interest is tax director turnover, I do not include this as a control in my main tests 
but rather control for CEO and CFO Turnover as they could impact tax director turnover. Gallemore et al (2014) 
also control for ABNORMAL RETURNS and LEVERAGE which I do not include in my regression as I try to 
stay consistent with controls in equation 1. 
 
32 
 
TURNOVER and the variable of interest is the interaction term 
SHELTERFIRM*REVEALYEAR. In column 1, I estimate equation (2) while controlling for 
SIZE, PROFITABILITY and PERFORMANCE while in columns 2 I also control for 
CEOTURNOVER and CFOTURNOVER as controlling for them results in a greatly reduced 
sample size. I require that each shelter/control match have complete data for all variables in 
order to estimate equation (2) which reduced the number of firm-years 
In columns 1 and 2 the results indicate a positive although insignificant coefficient of 
.183 and .068 which remains insignificant when CEOTURNOVER and CFOTURNOVER are 
controlled for. Overall, the results in Table 7 suggest that tax directors do not face 
consequences, in as far as turnover, from engaging in aggressive tax decisions, as measured 
by tax shelter revelations, compared to matched control firms. 
7.3 Tax-related Financial Statement Restatements and Tax Director Turnover 
Along with engaging in tax shelters, tax directors could also make GAAP violations that 
result in a tax-related restatement which may lead to turnover. Prior literature have found mixed 
results as to whether turnover is more likely for those managers whose firm engage in GAAP 
violations. Firstly, Beneish (1999) finds that turnover is no more likely for those managers whose 
firms are revealed to have engaged in corporate fraud or GAAP violations. On the other hand, 
Desai, et al. (2006) examine whether top managers (those listed in the proxy statements) face 
turnover after announcing an earnings restatement. Desai et al. (2006) find that at least one of the 
top five managers listed in the proxy statements face turnover within 24 months of making a 
financial statement restatement. Specific to tax, I examine whether tax directors face turnover 
following revelation of a tax-related financial statement restatement as the tax director is 
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responsible for the tax department.  
 In order to test whether tax directors face turnover after a tax-related restatement, I utilize 
audit analytics to identify 1,294 tax-related restatement firm-years from 1996 to 201219. I then 
merge the 1,294 restatement firm-years to the 6,054 firm-years for which I have sufficient tax 
director turnover info (the sample I used in my main tests). After merging I found an initial 
sample of 57 firm-years. I then follow Desai et al. (2006) and match the 57 sample firm-years to 
control firm-years who have no turnover. I match one-to-one on year, two digit sic code and total 
assets. I was only able to match 42 tax-related restatement firm-years as the other 15 control 
sample firm-years had no tax director info listed in the tax directory.  
 I then estimated equation (1) from my main tests but substituted β1 with an indicator variable 
for whether the firm had a tax related restatement or not. I set the indicator variable 
TAXRESTATE =1 for the 42 treatment firm-years that had a tax-related restatement and 
TAXRESTATE =0 for the 42 control firm-years.  
 Results (not presented) of estimating the regression reveal no association between having a 
tax related restatement and the tax director turning over. These results indicate that although 
restatements in general are seen as egregious offenses tax-related restatements may not be the 
responsibility of the tax director. Further the lack of results may also be due to the lack of data 
availability as I was only able to test 42 out of a possible 1,294 firm-years with tax-related 
restatements. 
7.4 Tax-related Internal Control Weaknesses and Tax Director Turnover 
One final tax-related violation that a tax director may turnover for is the presence of tax-
                                                            
19 Tax- related restatements have the following field value in audit analytics RES_ACC_RES_FKEY_LIST = “18”. 
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related internal control weaknesses. Other fields have examined whether internal control 
weaknesses lead to turnover of the CEO/CFO. Specifically, Haislip, Masli, Richardson and 
Sanchez (2014) examine internal control weaknesses related to information technology (IT) and 
find that firms with material weaknesses related to IT face higher turnover of CEOs and CFOs 
than those without. In a tax setting, Bauer (2015) states that tax-related internal control 
weaknesses reflect a manager’s discretion over tax planning. In line with this, Bauer (2015) finds 
that firms with tax-related internal control weaknesses have higher ETRs than those without tax-
related internal control weaknesses. Although Bauer (2015) noted an association between tax-
related internal control weaknesses and tax planning, no one has looked at whether managers 
face consequences from a tax-related internal control weakness. Therefore, I examine whether 
tax directors face turnover following revelation of a tax-related internal control weakness. 
 In order to test whether tax directors face turnover after a tax-related internal control 
weaknesses, following Bauer (2015), I utilize audit analytics to identify 1,142 tax-related internal 
control weakness firm-years from years 2004 to 20122021. I then merge the 1,142 restatement 
firm-years to the 6,054 firm-years for which I have sufficient tax director turnover info (the 
sample I used in my main tests). After merging I found an initial sample of 46 firm-years. I then 
follow Desai et al. (2006) and match the 46 sample firm-years to control firm-years who have no 
turnover. I match one-to-one on year, two digit sic code and total assets. I was able to match 39 
tax-related internal control weakness firm-years as the other 7 control sample firm-years had no 
tax director info listed in the tax directory.  
                                                            
20 Tax- related internal control weaknesses have the following field value in audit analytics 
NOTEFF_ACC_REAS_KEYS = "41". 
21 The sample period starts in 2004 as it is the first year for which Audit Analytics collects internal control 
weaknesses following enactment of Sarbanes Oxley.  
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 I then estimated equation (1) from my main tests but substituted β1 with an indicator variable 
for whether the firm had a tax related internal control weakness or not. I set the indicator variable 
TAXICW=1 for the 39 treatment firm-years that had a tax-related internal control weakness and 
TAXICW=0 for the 39 control firm-years.  
 Results (not presented) of estimating the regression reveal no association between having a 
tax related internal control weakness and the tax director turning over. These results indicate that 
internal control weakness may not be used in evaluating a tax director. Further the lack of results 
may also be due to the lack of data availability as I was only able to test 39 out of a possible 
1,142 firm-years with tax-related internal control weaknesses. 
7.5 Missing Analyst Forecast utilizing tax expense management and Tax Director Turnover 
One final benchmark that I explore is whether a firm was able to meet or beat analyst 
forecasts in the fourth quarter by engaging in tax avoidance. Puffer and Weintrop (1991) suggest 
that analysts perform an important monitoring function in which they establish performance 
benchmarks that managers are expected to meet. As analysts are in contact with CEOs and other 
top executives at firms it has been shown that analyst forecasts may reflect the CEO’s 
performance expectations. When it comes to turnover and analyst forecasts, prior literature has 
looked at the relationship between analyst forecast errors and the likelihood of CEO turnover. 
Puffer and Weintrop (1991) and Farrell and Whidbee (2003) both show that the deviation of real 
earnings from expected earnings could provide information about how CEO performance 
deviates from board expectations. Further, Farrell and Whidbee (2003) examine whether certain 
parts of analyst forecasts impact the turnover decision. Taken together, their results suggest that 
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meeting/beating analysts’ forecasts are an important metric used by boards to determine whether 
managers are meeting firm expectations.  
Within the tax literature, research has found that tax directors can use the complexity in 
the tax accounts and the discretion in GAAP to manipulate ETRs to meet or beat forecasts 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2004). Dhaliwal et al. (2004) explain that because the tax expense is the final 
account closed, it is one of the final tools that tax directors have at their disposal to achieve 
earnings targets. In fact, prior literature finds evidence that some firms do opportunistically 
manage the ETR downward to beat analyst expectations (Dhaliwal et al., 2004; Comprix et al., 
2006). Moreover, McGuire (2008) finds that firms that reduce their ETR to meet or beat analyst 
expectations are less likely to provide an explanation for a decrease in ETR, which is consistent 
with the tax director trying to mask earnings management. I examine whether tax directors who 
engage in downward earnings management through the tax expense to meet/beat analyst 
forecasts but who end up missing the forecast face turnover.  
 Utilizing the same sample as in my main tests, I estimated equation (1) but substituted β1 
with an indicator variable for whether the firm missed the analyst forecast while simultaneously 
decreasing the ETR from the 3rd quarter to the 4th quarter. I also do not control for CEO Turnover 
as prior literature focuses on the CFO as the person responsible for earnings management. I set 
the indicator variable MISSANDDEC=1 if the forecast was missed (actual <medest22) and if the 
ETR was managed (ETR decrease from Q323 to Q4). I set MISSANDDEC=0 if the forecast was 
                                                            
22 Median forecast come from the I/B/E/S summary file. I use the median forecast that is closest to the 
announcement date of actual EPS.  
 
23 ETRQ3 is calculated using the Compustat quarterly file as tax expense (Compustat TXTY) divided by pre-tax 
income (Compustat PIY) less special items (Compustat SPIY) Following Gupta and Newberry (1997) I bound the 
ETRQ3 to be between 0 and 1.   
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missed (actual <medest) and if the ETR was not managed (no ETR decrease from Q3 to Q4). 
This model allows me to isolate the firm-years that missed the forecast but tried to manage 
earnings through the tax account. Further, I remove all firm-years with missing actual forecasts, 
negative pre-tax income, negative tax expense and negative GAAPETR as it has been shown 
difficult to interpret findings of loss firms. I then also estimate equation (1) by limiting samples 
to only firms that were within 5 cents of missing the forecast as Dhaliwal et al. (2004) point out 
that those firms are most sensitive to earnings management per Brown (2001). Finally, I further 
limit the sample to include only non-loss firms as prior literature contends that it is hard to 
interpret the coefficients of loss-firms. A significant positive coefficient on MISSANDDEC 
implies that tax director TURNOVER is more likely to occur when the firm opportunistically 
manages the ETR downward while simultaneously missing the forecast. 
7.5.1 Multivariate Results 
Table 9 presents results of estimating equation (1) where the dependent variable is tax 
director TURNOVER and the variable of interest is MISSANDDEC. In column 1, I estimate 
equation (1) while controlling for SIZE, PROFITABILITY and PERFORMANCE and 
CFOTURNOVER. In column 2 I further limit the sample to firms that were within 5 cents of 
missing the forecast and then additionally in column 3 I remove loss firms as prior papers 
cite that interpreting coefficients from firm-years with losses is difficult.  
In column 1 the coefficient of interest, MISSANDDEC, is significantly positive at the 
5% level (coef: 0.91 and p-value: 0.045). Even after limiting to missing within 5 cents, in 
column 2 and limiting the sample to non-loss firms in column 3, the results show a positive and 
significant coefficient. Overall, the results from columns 1, 2 and 3 show that there is a positive 
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association between failing to meet analyst forecasts utilizing tax accounts and tax director 
turnover.  
8. Conclusion 
In this paper I investigate whether tax directors face consequences from their tax 
avoidance decisions. Prior literature utilizes publically available data (proxy statement data) to 
test for a relation between tax avoidance and CEO/CFO turnover but fails to examine the person 
that is directly responsible for tax planning at a firm. I utilize a new dataset which allows me to 
go beyond proxy data and examine the tax director who has the greatest impact on the tax 
expense. Further, while prior literature has concluded that compensation of tax directors is linked 
to the GAAP ETR no one has looked at turnover as a consequence. I find that when a firm’s 
GAAP ETR is above (below) its industry median GAAP ETR the tax director is more (less) 
likely to turnover. I also find that the more volatile the GAAPETR the more likely tax director 
turnover. Further, these results do not hold when I use CASHETR to calculate my variables of 
interest in my tax avoidance tests. This finding is consistent with prior literature that find that tax 
directors are evaluated based on how they can impact the tax expense and not cash taxes paid.  
In supplemental analysis I find that tax directors face turnover when they try to manage 
earnings utilizing the tax expense account but fail to meet analyst forecasts. In addition, I 
examine samples of firms that engaged in aggressive tax avoidance, had tax-related restatements 
and had tax-related internal control weaknesses. For these three tests, I do not find evidence that 
tax directors face consequences, as measured by turnover, compared to a set of matched tax 
directors. 
There is a caveat regarding my findings that is worth noting. I identify proxies for tax 
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director decision that prior literature and anecdotal evidence has used to evaluate executives 
although I note that this is not exhaustive and that tax directors may be evaluated based on other 
factors. Overall this paper provides a better understanding of who makes tax decisions at a firm 
as well as a better understanding of potential consequences faced by tax directors as they make 
tax avoidance decisions. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions   
      
Variable Description   
TURNOVER = one if the Tax Director or First Person Listed in the Tax Directory listed in 
year t+1 is different than who is listed in year t and zero otherwise. 
  
TAXAVOID =  measure of tax avoidance using INDDEV, ETRCHANGE and ETRVOL   
INDDEV = one if Firm's ETR> Industry Median ETR  
= zero if Firm's ETR< Industry Median ETR 
  
ETRCHANGE = ETR(t) - ETR(t-1)   
ETRVOL = the standard deviation of annual ETRs scaled by the absolute value of the 
annual mean ETRs over the same five year period (from t-4 to t) 
  
CEOTURONOVER = one if the CEO listed in year t is different than the CEO listed in year t-1 and 
zero otherwise. 
  
CFOTURNOVER = one if the CFO listed in year t is different than the CFO listed in year t-1 and 
zero otherwise. 
  
SIZE = natural log of total assets for year t;   
PROFITABILTY  = the ratio of pre-tax income at year t to total assets at the beginning of the year 
(also known as ROA) at t 
  
PERFORMANCE = earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) in year t divided by sales in year t;   
GAAP ETR = tax expense/ (pretax income - special items)   
CASH ETR = cash taxes paid/ (pretax income - special items)   
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Table 1: Sample Selection Steps    
    
Initial sample firm-years from 1996-2013  
        
8,211  
    
  Exclude firm-years missing a tax director in the previous year  
       
(1,237) 
  Exclude foreign incorporated firms (FIC !="USA" in Compustat)    (438) 
  Exclude subsidiaries (STKO=1 and 2 in Compustat)    (300) 
  Exclude firm-years with missing pre-tax income or tax expense     (182) 
Total Firm- year observations   6,054 
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Table 2: Sample classification by turnover, industry and year 
Panel A: Turnover Details       
  N %   
Firm-years without tax director turnover 5789 95.6%   
Firm-years with tax director turnover 265 4.4%   
Total Sample 6054 100.0%   
Notes: This table shows the breakdown of the sample of 6,054 firm-
years into tax director turnover versus no tax director turnover. 
  
  
  
Panel B: Industry Classification based on Fama and French 17 
Industries        
              
    Compustat   Sample 
Industry 
Classification 
Number Industry Classification Title Number 
Frequency 
(%)   Number 
Frequency 
(%) 
1 Food 4056 2%   206 3% 
2 Mining and Materials 3154 2%   79 1% 
3 Oil and Petroleum Products 6692 3%   173 3% 
4 Textiles, Apparel and Footwear 2121 1%   157 3% 
5 Consumer Durables 3300 2%   127 2% 
6 Chemicals 2787 1%   189 3% 
7 Drugs, Soap, Perfumes, Tobacco 6286 3%   235 4% 
8 Construction and Construction Materials 3965 2%   288 5% 
9 Steel Works Etc. 1778 1%   124 2% 
10 Fabricated Products 903 0%   56 1% 
11 Machinery and Business Equipment 17036 8%   807 13% 
12 Automobiles 1895 1%   134 2% 
13 Transportation 5076 3%   320 5% 
14 Utilities 5611 3%   294 5% 
15 Retail Stores 7338 4%   488 8% 
16 Financial Industry 69712 35%   896 15% 
17 Other 59638 30%   1481 24% 
Total       201,348  100%    6,054  100% 
Notes: This table shows the breakdown of the 6,054 firm-years by industry and compared to the Compustat 
Universe. The industry classification is based on the 17 industries identified by Fama and French (1997). 
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Table 2 continued: Sample classification by turnover, industry, year and compared to Compustat  
            
Panel C: Sample Details by Year       
Year Turnover =0 Turnover=1 Total  Total /6054   
1996 221 30 251 4%   
1997 355 7 362 6%   
1998 374 9 383 6%   
1999 412 12 424 7%   
2000 420 6 426 7%   
2001 304 37 341 6%   
2002 152 12 164 3%   
2003 213 3 216 4%   
2004 240 1 241 4%   
2005 243 2 245 4%   
2006 247 3 250 4%   
2007 241 13 254 4%   
2008 286 6 292 5%   
2009 308 6 314 5%   
2010 580 15 595 10%   
2011 562 20 582 10%   
2012 289 21 310 5%   
2013 342 62 404 7%   
Total 5789 265 6054 100%   
Notes: This table shows the breakdown of the sample of 6054 by year including a 
breakdown of the sample by year when turnover =0 and turnover =1. 
  
  
 
Panel D: Comparison of Median Total Assets, GAAP ETR and CASH ETR  
    Compustat  Sample         
Total Assets   $318 Million  $3,127 Million         
GAAP ETR   30.91%  31.19%         
CASH ETR   20.81%  21.57%         
Notes: This table shows the breakdown of the sample compared to the Compustat universe of firms 
based on Total Assets, GAAP ETR and CASH ETR. 
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Table 3: Univariate Results                        
                            
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics                       
                          P-value for 
difference in 
means between 
turnover = 1 
and turnover = 
0  
                          
  Full Sample Turnover =0 Turnover =1  
Variable N Mean Median
Std. 
Dev 
25th 
% 
75th 
% N Mean Median N Mean Median
GAAPETR 6054 0.22 0.31 1.78 0.18 0.37 5789 0.22 0.31 265 0.32 0.32 0.35 
CASHETR 5766 0.23 0.21 2.12 0.07 0.33 5519 0.23 0.21 247 0.18 0.23 0.73 
INDDEV^  5898 0.67 1 0.47 0 1 5639 0.66 1.00 259 0.74 1.00 0.01*** 
ETRCHANGE^ 5925 0.01 0 2.60 -0.06 0.05 5667 0.00 0.00 258 0.22 0.00 0.18 
ETRVOL^  5948 1.57 0.31 4.20 0.10 1.31 5687 1.61 0.32 261 0.85 0.25 0.01*** 
CEOTURNOVER 4937 0.01 0 0.12 0 0 4698 0.01 0 239 0.02 0 0.36 
CFOTURNOVER 2273 0.10 0 0.20 0 0 2140 0.10 0 133 0.12 0 0.38 
SIZE^ 6054 8.11 7.97 1.62 6.94 9.19 5788 8.08 7.94 265 8.72 8.72 0.00*** 
PROFITABILITY^ 6028 0.07 0.06 0.11 0.02 0.13 5763 0.07 0.06 265 0.08 0.06 0.20 
PERFORMANCE^ 6034 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.05 0.17 5771 0.12 0.10 263 0.13 0.12 0.06* 
                            
Notes: This table shows the mean, median, standard deviations, 25th percentile and 75th percentile for the full sample and then by whether a 
firm experienced turnover or not in a firm-year. Ttest is used to test for the difference in the means. The test of means for all variables. ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix A for a description of the variables. 
^ Variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% tails.               
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Table 3: Univariate Results (Continued)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 TURNOVER 0.0383* 0.0023 -0.0159 -0.0206 0.0153 0.0773* -0.0061 0.0068 0.0137 0.0265
2 INDDEV 0.0346* 0.2916* -0.3184* 0.0057 -0.0140 -0.0482* 0.2011* 0.3399* 0.1660* 0.1817*
3 ETRCHANGE 0.0180 0.1038* 0.0185 -0.0036 -0.0117 -0.0174 -0.0161 0.0881* 0.0542 0.0632*
4 ETRVOL -0.0361 -0.1536* -0.0011 0.0386 -0.0505* -0.1291* -0.2710* -0.4907* -0.2283* -0.2462*
5 CEOTURNOVER 0.0131 0.0117 0.0099 0.0067 0.2460* -0.0585* -0.0028 0.0171 -0.0152 -0.0215
6 CFOTURNOVER 0.0192 -0.0115 0.0217 -0.0045 0.2499* -0.0321 0.0109 0.0747* -0.0040 0.0590*
7 SIZE 0.0801* -0.0116 -0.0078 -0.1267* -0.0859* -0.0293 0.3140* -0.0929* -0.0341 -0.0567*
8 PERFORMANCE 0.0234 0.1396* 0.0127 -0.1431* 0.0007 0.0277 0.3754* 0.4102* 0.0339 0.0187
9 PROFITABILITY 0.0151 0.3293* 0.0262* -0.1871* 0.0415* 0.0581* 0.0098 0.4542* 0.1972* 0.2961*
10 GAAP ETR -0.0002 -0.0020 -0.0288* 0.0019 -0.0025 0.0029 0.0001 -0.0167 -0.0124 0.4555*
11 CASH ETR -0.0027 0.0168 0.0867* 0.0002 -0.0030 0.0108 0.0005 -0.0095 -0.0059 0.7096*
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
Variable
Notes:  This table contains spearman (above) and pearson (below) correlations for variables used in 
estimating equation (2). * indicates p-value of .05 or less.  Please refer to Appendix A for a description of the 
variables.
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Table 4: Logit analysis of tax director turnover regressed on Industry 
Deviation, CEOTurnover, CFOTurnover and control variables. 
  
              
Explanatory Variables GAAPETR  GAAPETR  GAAPETR  CASHETR  CASHETR  CASHETR   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
INDDEV 0.38** 0.58** 0.66** 0.10 0.15 -0.05 
  (0.026) (0.020) (0.024) (0.574) (0.660) (0.912) 
CEOTURNOVER   -16.15 -16.86   -15.45 -16.46 
    (0.997) (0.998)   (0.995) (0.998) 
CFOTURNOVER   2.58*** 2.91**   2.54*** 2.86** 
    (0.005) (0.015)   (0.006) (0.017) 
SIZE 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.30*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 0.000  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PROFITABILITY 1.65** 0.65 0.75 2.09*** 1.58 1.81 
  (0.040) (0.646) (0.685) (0.007) (0.251) (0.310) 
PERFORMANCE -2.03*** -1.86* -3.10**  -2.04*** -2.20** -3.26** 
  (0.005) (0.093) (0.051) (0.005) (0.047) (0.038) 
              
YEAR & INDUSTRY FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
NON-LOSS FIRMS ONLY No No Yes No No Yes 
              
N 5583 2209 1859 5568 2268 1914 
              
Pseudo R² 0.1446 0.1881 0.1980 0.1423 0.1788 0.1889 
              
Notes: This table shows the logistic regression results of estimating equation (1) with robust standard 
errors where the dependent variable is tax director turnover and the independent variable is Industry 
Deviation.  Models 1, 2 and 3 run equation (1) GAAP ETR while Models 4, 5, 6 use CASH ETR. 
Models 2 and 4 additionally add CEOTURNOVER and CFOTURNOVER as controls. Models 3 and 6 
additionally limit the sample to only non-loss firms. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix 
A for a description of the variables. 
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Table 5: Logit analysis of tax director turnover regressed on One Year ETR Change, 
CEOTurnover, CFOTurnover and firm level control variables. 
Explanatory Variables GAAPETR   GAAPETR  GAAPETR   CASHETR   CASHETR   CASHETR   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ETRCHANGE 0.04** 0.05* 0.05** -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 
  (0.019) (0.074) (0.044) (0.724) (0.955) (0.701) 
CEOTURNOVER   -16.20 -16.10    -14.77 -16.81 
    (0.997) (0.997)   (0.993) (0.999) 
CFOTURNOVER   2.48*** 2.36*    2.46*** 2.36* 
    (0.007) (0.062)   (0.007) (0.063) 
SIZE 0.27*** 0.29*** 0.06 *** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) 
PROFITABILITY 2.36***   1.79 2.74 2.63***  1.75 2.67 
  (0.002) (0.190) (0.155) (0.001) (0.206) (0.170) 
PERFORMANCE -1.80*** -2.16**  -3.11* -2.46*** -2.31**  -3.48* 
  (0.008) (0.049) (0.080) (0.002) (0.037) (0.055) 
              
YEAR & INDUSTRY FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
NON-LOSS FIRMS 
ONLY No No Yes No No Yes 
              
N 5634 2242 1720 5343 2189 1685 
              
Pseudo R² 0.1425 0.1795 0.2026 0.1460 0.1830 0.2095 
              
              
Notes: This table shows the logistic regression results of estimating equation (1)  where the dependent 
variable is tax director turnover and the independent variable is 1 Year ETR Change. Models 1, 2 and 
3 run equation (1) GAAP ETR while Models 4, 5 and 6 use CASH ETR. Models 2 and 5 additionally 
add CEOTURNOVER and CFOTURNOVER as controls.  Models 3 and 6 additionally limit the sample 
to only non-loss firms for both years used to calculate ETRCHANGE. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Please refer to Appendix A for a description of the variables. 
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Table 6: Logit analysis of tax director turnover regressed on ETR Volatility, 
CEOTurnover, CFOTurnover and firm level control variables. 
Explanatory 
Variables GAAPETR   GAAPETR   GAAPETR   CASHETR   CASHETR CASHETR   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ETRVOL 0.05 0.06* 0.08** -0.06 -0.08 -0.07 
  (0.123) (0.096) (0.043) (0.212) (0.465) (0.490) 
CEOTURNOVER    -14.00 -14.19   -13.91 -14.08 
    (0.992) (0.992)   (0.992) (0.992) 
CFOTURNOVER   2.41*  2.32*   2.37* 2.28* 
    (0.054) (0.065)   (0.058) (0.070) 
SIZE 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.23** 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.24** 
  (0.000) (0.006) (0.014) (0.000) (0.006) (0.012) 
PROFITABILITY 0.70 0.16 0.10 1.13 -0.28 -0.40 
  (0.542) (0.928) (0.960) (0.363) (0.878) (0.842) 
PERFORMANCE -1.62 -2.15 -1.40  -2.48*  -2.47 -1.78 
  (0.131) (0.151) (0.377) (0.078) (0.110) (0.275) 
              
YEAR & 
INDUSTRY FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
NO LOSS IN 5 YR 
PERIOD Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
NO TURNOVER IN 
5 YR PERIOD No No Yes No No Yes 
              
N 3762 1452 1338 3592 1434 1325 
              
Pseudo R² 0.1229 0.1332 0.1416 0.1246 0.1329 0.1393 
              
              
Notes: This table shows the logistic regression results of estimating equation (1)  where the dependent 
variable is tax director turnover and the independent variable is 1 Year ETR Volatility. Models 1, 2 
and 3 run equation (1) GAAP ETR while Models 4, 5 and 6 use CASH ETR. Models 2 and 5 
additionally add CEOTURNOVER and CFOTURNOVER as controls. The sample is limited to firm-
years with no losses during the 5 year period used to calculate ETRVOL.  Models 3 and 6 additionally 
limit the sample to firm years with no tax director turnover during the 5 year period to remove 
confounding effects. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix A for a description 
of the variables. 
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Table 7: Logit analysis of tax director turnover regressed on Shelter Firm, 
Reveal Year, Interaction term, CFOTurnover, CFOTurnover and control 
variables. 
      
Explanatory Variables Tax Director Turnover 
  (1) (2) 
SHELTERFIRM -0.22 -0.50  
  (0.46) (0.340)  
REVEALYEAR -0.59** -0.26  
  (0.046) (0.578)  
SHELTERFIRM*REVEALYEAR 0.183  0.068   
  (0.661) (0.919)  
CEOTURNOVER   0.33  
    (0.492)  
CFOTURNOVER   0.425   
    (0.434)  
SIZE -0.09 -0.27  
  (0.310) (0.121)  
PROFITABILITY -1.10 -1.85  
  (0.303) (0.410)  
PERFORMANCE 0.72 1.21  
  (0.363) (0.457)  
       
N 822 325  
       
Pseudo R² 0.0132 0.0283  
Notes: This table shows the logistic regression results of estimating equation (2) where 
the dependent variable is Tax Director Turnover. The independent variables are measures 
of shelter firms and reveal year and interaction term. Model 2 additionally controls for 
CEO and CFO Turnover. Coefficients are reported based on clustered standard errors. P-
values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix A for a description of the 
variables.  
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Table 8: Robustness Tests 
           
Panel A: Logit analysis of Tax Director turnover regressed on IndDev, ETRChange and 
ETRVol, CEOTurnover, CFOTurnover and control variables separately for Multinational and 
Domestic Firms. 
Explanatory 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Multinational Domestic Multinational Domestic Multinational Domestic 
INDDEV 0.55 1.66***         
  (0.143) (0.009)         
ETRCHANGE     0.23  0.06      
      (0.732) (0.216)     
ETRVOL         0.06  0.31  
          (0.284) (0.182) 
CEOTurnover -15.46 -16.96 -14.40 -13.84 -14.42 -16.46 
  (0.997) (0.998) (0.996) (0.998) (0.997) (0.997) 
CFOTurnover 2.79** -0.31 2.19* -0.45 1.98 0.97 
  (0.023) (0.584) (0.094) (0.410) (0.122) (0.620) 
Size 0.33*** 0.34 0.27** 0.25 0.388*** 0.06 
  (0.002) (0.124) (0.019) (0.250) (0.002) (0.711) 
Profitability 2.91 -13.57* 2.85 -5.48 3.49 -2.72 
  (0.237) (0.063) (0.255) (0.424) (0.174) (0.572) 
Performance -6.34** 0.18 -4.97** -0.72 -6.41** 1.20 
  (0.010) (0.962) (0.050) (0.822) 0.024  (0.628) 
              
Year & Industry 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Non-Loss Firms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
N 1,207 652 1,083 300 818 480 
              
Adjusted R² 0.2245 0.4937 0.2217 0.3420 0.1525 0.3437 
Notes: This table shows the logistic regression results of estimating equation (1)  where the dependent 
variable is tax director turnover and the independent variable is Industry Deviation (columns 1 and 2), 
ETR Change (Columns 3 and 4) and ETR Volatility (Columns 5 and 6). Models 1, 3 and 5 run 
equation (1) for multinational firms only while Models 2, 4 and 6 use domestic firms only. For 
columns 5 and 6 the sample is limited to firm-years with no losses or tax director turnover during the 5 
year period used to calculate ETRVOL . p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix A for a 
description of the variables. 
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Table 8: Robustness Tests       
Panel B: Logit analysis of Tax Director turnover regressed on IndDev, 
ETRChange and ETRVol, CEOTurnover, CFOTurnover and control 
variables excluding firm-years from 2008. 
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) 
          
INDDEV 0.73**     
    (0.015)     
ETRCHANGE   0.05*   
      (0.055)   
ETRVOL     0.06  
        (0.12) 
CEOTurnover -18.48 -16.31 -15.15 
    (0.997) (0.997) (0.998) 
CFOTurnover 1.21** 0.82 1.08 
    (0.048) (0.531) (0.998) 
Size   0.31*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 
    (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) 
Profitability 1.03 2.95 0.77 
    (0.585) (0.133) (0.706) 
Performance -3.02* -3.16* -2.17 
    (0.064) (0.087) (0.191) 
          
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
          
Non-Loss Firms Yes Yes Yes 
          
N   1,654 1,477 1,147 
          
Adjusted R² 0.1915 0.2005 0.1327 
Notes: This table shows the logistic regression results of estimating equation (1)  
where the dependent variable is tax director turnover and the independent 
variable is Industry Deviation (column 1), ETR Change (Column 2) and ETR 
Volatility (Column 3) excluding firm-years from 2008 . p-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix A for a description of the 
variables. 
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Table 8: Robustness Tests 
  
Panel C: Logit analysis of CEO and CFO turnover regressed on IndDev, ETRChange 
and ETRVol and control variables. 
Explanatory 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  CEO CFO CEO CFO CEO CFO 
INDDEV 1.86 -0.39         
  (0.302) (0.535)         
ETRCHANGE     2.44  1.01      
      (0.564) (0.590)     
ETRVOL         -1.05 -1.21 
          (0.873) (0.259) 
CEOTurnover   69.61   84.95   39.96 
    (0.995)   (0.998)   (0.998) 
CFOTurnover 67.44   188.46   80.27   
  (0.995)   (0.896)   (0.998)   
Size -1.01* 0.21 -0.88* 0.14 -5.01** 0.01 
  (0.078) (0.299) (0.100) (0.512) (0.031) (0.941) 
Profitability 11.13 0.33 12.89 -0.56 26.37 -3.23 
  (0.262) (0.933) (0.228) (0.893) (0.142) (0.472) 
Performance -15.42 1.67 -16.58 2.16 -58.55* 2.26 
  (0.199) (0.662) (0.159) (0.596) (0.074) (0.510) 
              
Year & Industry 
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Non-Loss Firms Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
N 1,859 1,859 1,668 1,668 1,298 1,298 
              
Adjusted R² 0.786 0.9035 0.7811 0.9021 0.8659 0.8753 
Notes: This table shows the logistic regression results of estimating equation (1) but replacing 
CEO and CFO Turnover for Tax director Turnover. In columns 1, 3 and 5 the dependent 
variable is CEOTurnover and in columns 2, 4 and 6 the dependent variable is CFO turnover. 
The independent variable is Industry Deviation (columns 1 and 1), ETR Change (Columns 3 
and 4) and ETR Volatility (Columns 5 and 6). p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer 
to Appendix A for a description of the variables. 
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Table 8: Robustness Tests 
Panel D: Logit analysis of Tax Director turnover regressed on IndDev, 
ETRChange and ETRVol and CEO and CFO Turnover at t-2 and controls. 
Explanatory Variables       
    (1) (2) (3) 
INDDEV 0.60*     
    (0.061)     
ETRCHANGE   -0.01   
      (0.914)   
ETRVOL     0.08* 
        (0.067) 
CEOTurnover -14.59 -14.17 -24.92 
    (0.996) (0.995) (0.991) 
CFOTurnover -0.11 -0.15 14.95 
    (0.925) (0.898) (0.991) 
Size   0.31*** 0.29*** 0.33*** 
    (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) 
Profitability 2.20 3.68* -3.84 
    (0.256) (0.074) (0.303) 
Performance -3.89** -4.13** 2.20** 
    (0.025) (0.039) (0.050) 
          
Year & Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
          
Non-Loss Firms Yes Yes Yes 
          
N   1,669 1,485 1,159 
          
Adjusted R² 0.2234 0.2306 0.176 
Notes: This table shows the logistic regression results of estimating equation (1) but 
replacing CEO and CFO Turnover in year t-2 as controls. The independent variable 
is Industry Deviation (column 1 , ETR Change (Column 2) and ETR Volatility 
(Column 3) . p-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix A 
for a description of the variables. 
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Table 9: Logit analysis of tax director turnover regressed on Miss and Decrease,                      
CEO Turnover, CFO Turnover and control variables. 
        
Explanatory Variables       
  (1) (2) (3) 
MISSANDDEC 0.91** 2.08* 3.30* 
  (0.045) (0.093) (0.054) 
CFOTURNOVER 16.624  0.01  -0.36 
  (0.991) (0.991) (0.761) 
SIZE 0.22 -0.41 -0.27 
  (0.176) (0.207) (0.388) 
PROFITABILITY 5.36* -4.31 -2.52 
  (0.099) (0.549) (0.731) 
PERFORMANCE -2.76 2.18 3.75 
  (0.396) (0.590) (0.598) 
        
YEAR & INDUSTRY FE Yes Yes Yes 
        
MISSED WITHIN 5 CENTS No Yes Yes 
        
NON-LOSS FIRMS ONLY No No Yes 
        
N 488 46 41 
        
Pseudo R² 0.1727 0.1578 0.2384 
        
Notes: This table shows the logistic regression results of estimating equation (1) with robust standard errors 
where the dependent variable is tax director turnover and the independent variable is Missed and Decreased 
ETR.  Model 2 additionally limits the sample to those firm-years where the miss amount was 5 cents or less. 
Model 3 additionally limits the sample to only non-loss firms. P-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Please refer to Appendix A for a 
description of the control variables. 
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